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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE 
OF MR, ALLEN'S FRAUDULENT CREDIT-CARD PURCHASES 
INASMUCH AS THOSE PURCHASES CONSTITUTED EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE TO DEMONSTRATE 
CHARACTER. 
In its Brief, the State argues that the evidence of Mr. 
Allen's fraudulent-credit purchases constituted intrinsic evidence 
that does not implicate the purposes of Rule 404(b). See Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 21-22. According to the State, the evidence of Mr. 
Allen's fraud demonstrated his role in the conspiracy to commit 
his wife's murder. Id. at 23-25. Neither case law nor the 
evidence presented during trial support the State's contentions. 
In support of its contention that acts committed in 
furtherance of a conspiracy are not extrinsic evidence for 
purposes of Rule 404(b), the State cites United States v. Nichols, 
374 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 2004). Id. at p. 21. According to 
Nichols, "Other act evidence is intrinsic when the evidence of the 
other act and the evidence of the crime charged are inextricably-
intertwined or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or 
the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged. 
Nichols, 374 F.3d at 1007 (emphasis added) (quoting United States 
v. Lambert, 995 F.2d 1006, 1007 (10th Cir.), 510 U.S. 926, 114 
S.Ct. 333 (1993)). 
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In this case, the fraudulent credit-card purchases are not 
inextricably intertwined with the alleged conspiracy to commit 
murder. Rather, the record demonstrates no relationship 
whatsoever between the fraudulent credit-card purchases and the 
alleged conspiracy to commit the murder of Jill Allen. 
Furthermore, other than the self-serving testimony of Joey 
Wright,1 the State presented no evidence that the fraudulent 
credit-card purchases were part of the alleged conspiracy to 
commit murder as a single criminal episode. In fact, other than 
Wright's testimony, no evidence was presented that the credit-card 
fraud was part of the alleged conspiracy to commit murder. Wright 
x0n cross-examination, the following testimony was elicited from 
Joey Wright about his willingness to lie about good friends: 
COUNSEL: Now, in that regard, being a good friend of 
yours doesn't always necessarily mean that you 
won't cheat on your friend, correct? 
WRIGHT: That's correct. 
COUNSEL: In fact, being Joey Wright's friend may mean 
that Joey Wright will do what he can to get over 
on a friend as well, correct? 
WRIGHT: That's correct. 
COUNSEL: What do you mean by getting over on people? 
WRIGHT: Stealing from them. Taking from them. 
COUNSEL: Lying to them? 
WRIGHT: That's correct. 
COUNSEL: Lying about them, if necessary? 
WRIGHT: If it's to my advantage, yes. 
* * * "k 
COUNSEL: You've lied before, Mr. Wright? 
WRIGHT: Yes, I have. 
COUNSEL: We don't know whether you will lie again, 
correct, Mr. Wright? 
WRIGHT: It's true. 
(R. 2053: 755-56; R. 2 053:758:5-9). 
claimed that Mr. Allen told him about the fraudulent purchases but 
neither Wright nor any of the alleged co-conspirators had any 
involvement in the fraudulent credit-card purchases. 
Finally, in light of State's inability to demonstrate any 
nexus between the fraudulent credit-card purchases and the alleged 
conspiracy to commit the murder, it failed to prove that the acts 
of credit-card fraud were necessary preliminaries to the alleged 
murder conspiracy. Consequently, the fraudulent credit-card 
purchases are extrinsic evidence and fall directly within the 
scope of Rule 404(b). See United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 
1149 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating "intrinsic evidence" is evidence 
"which is inextricably intertwined as 'an integral part of the 
immediate context of the crime charged.'"). 
The State's argument that the fraudulent credit-card 
purchases are intrinsic evidence of the conspiracy to commit 
murder is an attempt to bootstrap the unrelated fraudulent acts of 
Mr. Allen to the conspiracy to commit murder. See 22 Charles Alan 
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure § 
5239, at 452 (1978) (warning that justifying the admissibility of 
criminal transactions "on the ground that they were part of the 
conspiracy" presents "a danger here of bootstrapping that will 
completely undermine the policy of Rule 404(b)"). Simply because 
the State argues that the fraudulent credit-card purchases were 
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part of the history of the conspiracy to commit murder is not an 
adequate ground for the admission of other crimes evidence. See 
United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1416 (10th Cir. 1990); 
see also United States v. Arana, 182 F.R.D. 236, 240 (E.D. Mich. 
1998), aff'd, 51 Fed. Appx. 488 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 
1076, 123 S.Ct. 667 (2002). The State must provide some probative 
purpose for admission of the fraudulent credit-card purchase 
evidence, which, for the previously discussed reasons, is wholly 
lacking in the instant case. Sullivan, 919 F.2d at 1416. 
A. The Evidence of Mr, Allen's Fraudulent Credit-Card 
Purchases Provided No Proof of the Monies 
Allegedly Paid to Mr. Wright. 
The State's argument that the fraudulent credit-card 
purchases provided proof of Mr. Allen's role in the conspiracy to 
commit murder by accounting for monies paid to Wright is not 
supported by the record on appeal. In the course of direct 
examination, Wright testified that Mr. Allen paid him by way of 
cash payments in various amounts over the course of several months 
from April or May 1996 to approximately October of that same year 
(R. 2053:610-621). None of the dates or amounts provided by 
Wright in his testimony even approximate the dates upon which the 
fraudulent credit-card purchases occurred or the amounts of the 
10 
purchases. 2 See State's Exhibits G2 0 through G2 8 attached as 
Addendum E to the Brief of Appellant. 
In the course of its motion in limine for the admission of 
the fraud evidence, the State argued that the purpose of the 
evidence of the fraudulent credit-card purchases was to show how 
Mi Allen created a scheme to disguise the f ] ow of n Lone y to 
Wright, and to corroborate Wright's testimony of a conspiracy (R. 
589) . However, as previously discussed, the record reveals 110 
connection between the fraudulent credit-card purchases and a 
scheme to disguise the alleged payment of monies to Wright, The 
State presented no evidence that Mr. Allen had reason to conceal 
from anyone the manner in which he spent money. Rather, the 
testimony at trial demonstrates that Jill Allen participated in at 
least one of the fraudulent credit-card purchases of golf 
eqi J i pment (R 2058 11658-59) . Furthermore, tv TO of the f raudulent 
acts occurred after the murder See State's Exhibits G2 6, G2 7, 
ai id G28 attached as Addendum E to the Bi: i ef of Appel lant:, 
2Not only did none of the dates or amounts provided by Wright 
correspond to the alleged payments from Mr. Allen, the State's 
financial expert witness conceded that there was no "line by line 
relationship" between the cash withdrawals by Mr. Allen and the 
alleged payments to Wright (R. 2056:2-12). 
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B. The Evidence of Mr. Allen's Fraudulent Credit-Card 
Purchases Provided No Corroboration of Mr. 
Wright's Testimony. 
At trial, Joey Wright testified that Mr. Allen had told him 
that the money paid to him would be accounted for by purchases 
with stolen credit cards (R. 2053:643:11-21). However, the State 
failed to make any connection between the fraudulent credit-card 
purchases and the money allegedly paid to Wright. In fact, the 
State presented only a very small amount of the fraudulent credit-
card evidence through the testimony of Joey Wright. Rather, the 
State elicited and emphasized evidence of Mr. Allen's fraudulent 
credit-card transactions by way of the testimony from Sergeant 
John Herndon of the North Salt Lake Police Department (See, e.g., 
R. 2055:994-96) . The State then emphasized the fraudulent credit-
card transactions by the introduction of documentary evidence (See 
R. 2056:1208-11) .3 Those documents or Exhibits included the 
State's Exhibit G-20 through G-28;4 State's Exhibit G-29 (Cell 
phone records showing calls from Mr. Allen's cell phone to The 
Bombay Company); and (State's Exhibit G-30 (Cell phone records 
showing call from Mr. Allen's cell phone to Uinta Golf)). 
3The fraudulent credit-card transaction documents were presented 
by way of overhead projector to the jury (R. 2 056:1211:15) . 
4A copy of State's Exhibits G-20 through G-30 are attached as 
Addendum E to the Brief of Appellant. 
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THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE 
OF MR. ALLEN'S FRAUDULENT CREDIT-CARD PURCHASES 
UNDER RULE 404(b). 
Having demonstrated that the evidence of Mr. Allen's 
fraudulent credit-card transactions is extrinsic evidence that 
falls directly within the rubric of Rule 404 (b) , the issue before 
the Court is whether ti le tr:i a ] coi :i i : t: abi ise :i :i ts d :i scretd c n fcn, r 
admitting such evidence under Rule 4 04 (b) , Prior to deciding 
whether evidence of other crimes \ i : :>ngs , and bad acts is 
admissible under Rule 404(b), the State is correct that "the trial 
COL, . .in ii s t first dete r mi ne (1) \ , he t he r s i i c 1 i e v i d e i I c e i s b e :i ng 
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) 
whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 4 02, and (3) 
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State 
v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 120, 993 P. 2d 837 (italicized emphasis 
added); see also State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2 00 0 UT 59, HHlo-zu, 6 
P. 3d 1120. The "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be 
scrupi 11 ously examined by trial judges :i i i 11 le proper exercise of 
that discretion." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1fl8 (citation omitted). 
11 i t: 1 i • E c < i) i i r s e of r u ] i i ig t: 1 I a t: e ^ ;r i d e i i c e o f M i: A lien's 
fraudulent credit-card transactions were admissible, the trial 
coI 11 t: coi ieluded "that i.f 11 ie State's e\ idence comes i i i 3,s t h 3) 
anticipate, the evidence would be relevant for an appropriate 
purpose and non-character purpose; that is, intent, preparation, 
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plan and knowledge." (italicized emphasis added) (R. 2062:7:13-
16) .5 However, as demonstrated above, the State, in the course of 
presenting evidence of Mr. Allen's fraudulent credit-card 
transactions, failed to establish any connection between the fraud 
and the alleged conspiracy to commit the murder of Jill Allen. 
Consequently, the evidence presented by the State of the 
fraudulent acts committed by Mr. Allen was not offered for a non-
character purpose as required by Rule 404(b). 
In its bench ruling, the trial court also concluded that the 
State's fraud evidence was relevant "to showing the conspiracy 
element as some evidence supportive of the agreement to commit 
murder." (R. 2062:8:1-4). However, the State's evidence of Mr. 
Allen's criminal and fraudulent acts does not satisfy the 
requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 402. According to Rule 402, 
"[ejvidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Utah R. 
Evid. 402. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 4 01. 
"Other crime evidence is admissible if it 'tends to prove some 
fact that is material to the crime charged--other than the 
5The trial court's bench ruling is attached as Addendum D to the 
Brief of Appellant. 
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defendant's propensity to con u i: d t: crime.'" State v. Bli iff 2002 UT 
66, i[56, 52 P.3d 1210. In light of the State's failure to 
demonstrate any connection between the fraudulent transactions and 
the alleged conspiracy to commit murder, the evidence of Mr. 
Allen's fraudulent credit-card purchases did not tend to prove 
some fact that is material to the charged conspiracy to commit 
Jill Allen's murder. Instead, the record evidence of the 
fraudulent credit-card purchases demonstrates that those 
fraudulent acts were anything but an integral part of the alleged 
conspiracy !:  : • ::c: >i i n i i:i t n n irder. 
Ill, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT THE REQUISITE 
BALANCING TEST UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 
PRIOR TO ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OF MR. ALLEN'S 
FRAUDULENT CREDIT-CARD PURCHASES. 
"Finally, the trial court must determine whether the bad acts 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f206 P. 3d 1120. 
"Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence xif its probative va] ile :is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion the issues, or mislead \r-: ; -. -iry, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste time, or needless 
present at ioi i of ci m: i: n :i ] at: ve evi dence . ' " State \ , Wxdd isonf 2 00] I JT 
60, f41, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403). In State v. 
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1995), this Court stated: 
15 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to 
the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which 
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Id. at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 
565 (3d ed. 1984) (emphasis added)). 
Contrary to the State's bald assertions, the trial court 
failed to perform the requisite balancing under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403 prior to admitting evidence of the fraudulent credit-
card purchases by Mr. Allen. Without any real consideration of 
the matters to be considered in the course of performing a Rule 
403 balancing, the trial court essentially concluded that the 
probative value of the fraud evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by prejudice (R. 2062:8-9).6 This unsupported 
conclusion is of critical importance because it unduly restricted 
the scope and applicability of the requisite Rule 403 balancing. 
See United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(providing detailed analysis of trial court's failure to perform 
Rule 403 balancing). 
6The trial court's bench ruling and Rule 4 03 analysis, or lack 
thereof, is attached as Addendum D to the Brief of Appellant. 
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The i: ecoi c:I ] acks ai r ' indication thai : • ; ; 
performed the required balancing test. Further, the burden of 
demonstrating that the balancing test favors admission lies on the 
State. Cf. State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986). 
Without evidence that the trial court examined and properly 
considered the various factors outlined by the Coi i :i : t: i n Shickles, 
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Mr. Allen's 
fraudulent credit-card purchases. 
Mr. Allen's acknowledgment that he committed the fraudulent 
acts increased the ] ike 1 i 1 Iood that t: 1 Ie ji 11 \ woi i.3 ci focus oi i I: :i i s 
fraudulent acts instead of the State's burden of proving the 
alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Saunders, 
1999 UT 59, 1fl5, 992 P.2d 951 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970)) This, in turn, increased the danger 
that the jury felt that Mr. Allen should be punished for his acts 
of fraud even if the evidence of his alleged involvement in the 
conspiracy to commit murder is not beyond a reasonable doiibt, 
Consequently, the conclusiveness increased the likelihood that the 
jury woi i.1 d a i i :i d i ci convi c t Mi :, A1 1 ei i ba s ed on 1 :i :i s e r :i i: ni na ] 
character or propensity to commit bad acts. 
The re we re i 10 s :i m :i ] arities bet we en the c i i i ne s , 11 I f a c t: 11 le 
State failed to establish any connection between the fraudulent 
activity and the alleged conspiracy. Itoreover, the interval of 
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time factor and the lack of any corresponding relationship between 
Mr. Allen's fraudulent acts and the alleged payments to Wright 
demonstrate the low or nonexistent probative value of the 
fraudulent credit-card transactions. 
The trial court failed to consider, as a Rule 403 factor, 
that the need for the evidence as well as the efficacy of 
alternative proof was extremely low in the instant case. Not only 
did Joey Wright identify Mr. Allen as a co-conspirator in the 
murder by testifying that he received numerous cash payments both 
before and after the murder, but Joey Wright's spouse, Jenny 
Wright, and Tony Taylor testified against Mr. Allen as well. 
Consequently, the extremely prejudicial evidence of Mr. Allen's 
fraudulent and criminal conduct was unnecessary to the State's 
case, especially when considered in light of the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury based 
solely on Mr. Allen's criminal character or propensity to commit 
bad acts. 
Two concerns are expressed by the first sentence of Rule 
404(b) : First, that the jury may convict a defendant as a "xbad 
man' who deserved to be punished -- not because he is guilty of 
the crime charged but because of his prior or subsequent 
misdeeds;" and second, "that the jury will infer that because the 
accused committed other crimes, he probably committed the crime 
18 
charged." United States v Phillips, 599 F.2d 1 34, 1 3 6 (6tl i C: i i: 
1979); see also Saunders, 1999 UT 59 at fl5. 
''Because x[e]vidence of prior criminal acts is almost always 
prejudicial to the defendant,' the use of such evidence must be 
carefully circumscribed to protect the defendant from unfair 
prejudice." United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1416 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Shephard, 739 F.2d 510, 513 
(10th Ci I. ] 984)). Three types of prejudice, at the very least, 
arise from the admission of other crimes evidence such as the 
fraudulent credit-card pi ir chases :i i I t:l u E :i i is t ant case Stat e i; 
Peterson, 696 P.2d 387, 393 (Kan. 1985 ) . "First, a jury might 
well exaggerate the value of the other crime[sI . . . as evidence 
inferring that, because a defendant has committed a similar crime 
before, it can be concluded that he committed this one. " 
Id. "Second, the jury might conclude that the defendant deserves 
punishment because he has been a wrongdoer in the past even where 
the moving party has failed to establish by the proper burden of 
proof that the defendant has committed the act for which he is now 
being tr:i ed • • I d "Th :i rd, the jury might cone] ude that, because 
of the defendant's past acts, the evidence on his behalf should 
not be believed' 
Here, the trial court, by not conducting the requisite Rule 
403 balancing, failed to carefully circumscribe the State's use of 
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Mr. Allen's fraudulent credit-card transactions in order to 
protect Mr. Allen from unfair prejudice. Consequently, as 
specifically discussed above, the aforementioned three types of 
prejudice resulted from the admission of the fraudulent credit -
card transactions. Empirical research demonstrates that the 
joinder of offenses is prejudicial towards the defendant. See 
Kenneth S. Bordens and Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal 
Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9 
Law and Hum. Behav. 339, 349 (1985).7 The applicability of this 
research to other crimes evidence and Rule 404(b) is equally 
efficacious. According to the research, "Defendants are more 
likely to be convicted on a given charge when that charge is tried 
within the context of a joined rather than severed trial." Id. at 
pp. 349-50. "In general, there is evidence to show that jurors do 
confuse and accumulate evidence and do draw criminal personality 
inferences in joined trials." Id. at p. 350. Furthermore, 
empirical research generally demonstrates that limiting jury 
instructions in joinder-of-offense situations do not influence 
qualified jurors' judgments and tend to be ineffective. See Sarah 
Tanford, Steven Penrod, and Rebecca Collins, Decision Making in 
7A copy of Kenneth S. Bordens and Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder of 
Criminal Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psychological 
Literature, 9 Law and Hum. Behav. 339 (1985) is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. 
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Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence oi Charge Similarity, 
Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 Law and Hum. 
Behav. 319, pp. 333-34 (1985).8 
IV. THE TRIA1. COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
DETERMINING THAT THE "LIE DETECTOR" REFERENCE WAS 
INNOCUOUS AND THEREBY DENYING THE FIRST MOTION FOR 
A MISTRIAL. 
The State argues that the trial court correctly found that 
the ulie detector"9 reference d :i c:I i lot prejudi ce Mi 
therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
the f:i rst motion lui .i mistrial. -See Br lef of Appellee, pp. 31-
37. By so arguing, the State asserts that State v. Eldredge, 773 
P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), is inapposite to the instant case. 
In State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), this Court, in 
the course of addressing the admissibility of polygraph evidence, 
acknowledged the insufficient reliability of polygraph data aiid 
the tendency for the fact finder to be overawed by such. Id, at 
37. The unreliable nature of polygraph evidence arid :i ts tendency 
8A copy of Sarah Tanford, Steven Penrod, and Rebecca Collins, 
Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge 
Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 Law and 
Hum. Behav. 319 (1985) is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
9The term "lie detector" is arguably more egregious than 
"polygraph". This is especially true in the instant case where the 
testimony of Wright prior to the initial "lie detector" reference 
involved allegati ons that he and Mi". Allen had "faked" their 
conversations over the telephone, "talking of our innocence." (R. 
2053 :644-45) . 
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to result in the abdication by the fact finder of its truth-
finding function is directly relevant to the instant case. 
Moreover, the "lie detector" references, without any polygraph 
results or explanation as to why the results of such an exam were 
not admitted, are more egregious. 
The "lie detector" reference by the State's star witness, 
Joey Wright, allowed the jury to speculate about why the results 
of Mr. Allen's supposed polygraph examination were not placed into 
evidence or even discussed at trial. This in turn allowed the 
jury to conclude that Mr. Allen was trying to hide the negative 
results of the "lie detector" test. 
The "lie detector" reference by Joey Wright was exacerbated 
by the prosecutorial misconduct of allowing the comment to be 
brought to the attention of the jury a matter that it would not 
be justified in considering in determining its verdict. See State 
v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 1J22, 999 P. 2d 7 (quoting State v. Longshaw, 
961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) . The State knew that the 
police had requested that Mr. Allen take a polygraph examination.10 
Rather than take precautions to prevent the "lie detector" 
reference, the State allowed and arguably elicited the lie 
10The prosecutor, in the course of preparing for Joey Wright's 
testimony at trial, met with him on more than six occasions (R. 
2 053:659:2-5). Consequently, the prosecutor had a good understanding 
of Wright's testimony and presumably the answer elicited (R. 
2053:659-60) . 
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detector reference, which, in turn, allowed the jury to abdicate 
its all-important and difficult truth finding function.11 
V. THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE LAW AND 
ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN THE 
COURSE OF DENYING THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED 
ON JUROR MISCONDUCT. 
In its Brief, the State argues that the trial court correctly 
denied the motion for a new trial based upon juror misconduct 
because the juror contact was not with a "court participant". See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 59-61. The State's argument, however, fails 
to take into account crucial distinguishing facts and 
circumstances. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the legal standard to be 
applied in the instant case is set forth in State v. Pike, 712 
P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), in which this Court articulated the 
following rule: 
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises 
from any unauthorized contact during a trial 
between witnesses, attorneys or court 
personnel and jurors which goes beyond a mere 
incidental, unintended, brief contact . . . . 
[W]hen the contact is more than incidental, 
the burden is on the prosecution to prove 
that the unauthorized contact did not 
influence the juror. 
lxThe State's claims concerning inadequate briefing are without 
merit in light of Utah case law and the applicable rule of appellate 
procedure. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, %7, 1 P. 3d 1108 and 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (9) . 
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Id. at 280/ see also, Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P. 2d 224, 225-26 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); cf. State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, f45, 44 
P.3d 805 (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) 
(citations omitted) ) . For all intents and purposes, the contact 
that served as the basis for the motion for a new trial occurred 
between the juror and Ms. Camille Mauerhan. Although press 
reports and spouses were the mediums through which the information 
traveled, the contact substantially amounted to improper contact 
between the juror, a witness, and counsel. Consequently, this 
case does not present the innocuous contact between a juror and an 
outsider as the State would have this Court believe. The contact 
involved testimony and assertions of interested parties. 
This distinction is particularly important in the instant 
case because first, jury taint is nearly impossible to prove or, 
in other words, "improper contacts may influence a juror in ways 
he or she may not even be able to recognize." See State v. 
Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 943 (1925); State v. Velasquez, 
672 P. 2d 1254, 1263 (Utah 1983) . Second, there exists a need in 
judicial proceedings such as the instant case to avoid the 
appearance of impropriety. See State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 
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1109 (Utah 1977); Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 P. 188, 190 
(1928) .12 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Allen respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the district 
court together with any necessary instructions deemed appropriate. 
Mr. Allen further requests that this Court grant him any further 
relief the Court deems just and appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JjL day of October, 2004. 
SINS, P.C. 
r
r& /fojj^lSefendant 
12The State did not address the cumulative error argument set 
forth on pages 41 through 42 of the Brief of Appellant. Contrary to 
the State's assertion, this case is particularly appropriate for 
consideration under the cumulative error doctrine. 
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Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1985 
Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of 
the Legal and Psychological Literature* 
Kenneth S. Bordenst and Irwin A. Horowitz$ 
Criminal courts routinely allow a defendant to be tried for multiple charges in a single trial. The 
practice is known as joinder of offenses. The issue of joinder of offenses is examined from a legal 
and psychological perspective. Relevant court decisions and their implications are discussed. In ad-
dition, the recent research conducted by social scientists concerning the possible reasons for the 
prejudicial effects of joinder of offenses is critically reviewed. Suggestions are offered, based upon 
previous joinder research, for the direction of future research into the loci of the effect and into 
potential remedies. 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of recent studies of legal issues by social psychologists have demon-
strated that joining of criminal offenses results in a bias against the defendant. 
Specifically, the research indicates that the defendant is more likely to be found 
guilty in a joined trial as compared to separate trials on each offense (Horowitz, 
Bordens, & Feldman, 1980; Tanford & Penrod, 1982; Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; 
Tanford, 1983). 
There are two competing interests at play relating to joinder of offenses: 
Saving the time and the expense involved in separate trials, and the interest of 
the defendant in obtaining a fair, unbiased trial. Because of the conflicting inter-
ests, compromises must be reached. Most often these compromises favor judicial 
efficiency. The impact of joinder of offenses is mitigated by the fact that concur-
rent sentences are often meted out for any multiple convictions. Presumably, the 
* This paper is an elaboration of one presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal 
Justice Sciences, Chicago, March 1984. 
t Department of Psychological Sciences, Indiana University—Purdue University, 2101 Coliseum 
Boulevard East, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46805. 
t Department of Psychology, University of Toledo, 2801 W. Bancroft St., Toledo, Ohio 43606. 
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court's interests are served by saving time and expense and the defendant's by 
meting out the concurrent sentences. 
The interest expressed by both the courts and social scientists suggests that 
the issue of joinder of offenses is of great importance on a thoretical and practical 
level. This paper has three objectives: (1) to review and evaluate the legal rules 
underlying the joinder of criminal offenses; (2) to review and critically analyze 
the psychological literature, both theoretical and empirical, relating to the 
"joinder effect"; and (3) to suggest the direction for future joinder research with 
respect of both the locus of the effect and possible remedies. 
Joinder of Offenses: Legal Background 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the requirements 
for joinder of offenses or defendants in the same indictment or information 
(Georgetown, 1983). Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
the prosecution may join multiple offenses if they are of the same or similar 
character, are based upon the same transaction, or are based upon the same 
transactions constituting part of a common pattern of behavior. It should be noted 
that many state statutes concerning joinder are patterned after the federal rule. 
The rule allowing for joinder of offenses seems to have evolved from a con-
cern over judicial economy. Rule 8 appears to balance the prejudice inherent in 
joined trials against the benefits of judicial economy. However, the dominant 
theme of the rule is the issue of judicial economy. By combining several charges 
into a single proceeding the court saves the time and expense of seating several 
juries and tying up valuable court time (Harder, 1982). In practice, the beneficiary 
of the joinder rules is the prosecution. Not only can the prosecution economize 
by preparing only one trial, but may also benefit by the possibility of obtaining 
more convictions. In any event, the defendant's rights appear to be subordinate 
to judicial economy. 
An alternative view of the evolution of joinder rules is provided by Nowak 
and Key (1982). According to Nowak and Key, joining of criminal offenses served 
the purpose of protecting the defendant against being charged serially on a number 
of related offenses. In response to concerns over multiple convictions several 
state legislatures have enacted statutes prohibiting multiple convictions or con-
secutive sentences for a single criminal episode (Nowak and Key, 1982). 
Improper Joinder and Severance 
Generally speaking, the trial judge has wide discretion when joinder issues 
are considered. The defense may make a pretrial motion to have charges sepa-
rated (severance). The law does provide for severance of offenses when joinder 
would be inherently prejudicial (Georgetown, 1983). 
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if either 
the defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder the trial court may grant 
a motion to sever the offenses. In considering a pretrial motion to sever the trial 
judge must weigh the competing interests of possible prejudice to the defendant 
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and the public interest in avoiding possibly redundant separate trials (George-
town, 1983). 
The courts are cognizant of the possible prejudicial effects of joinder but feel 
that equity is restored by meting out concurrent sentences for convictions arising 
out of joined offenses. The court has also found some consolation in the fact that 
a judicial instruction is delivered to jurors to keep joined charges separate and 
arrive at independent verdicts. Consequently, the court often tips the scales in 
the favor of the prosecution and denies a pretrial motion to sever offenses. 
If the trial judge denies a motion to sever and conviction occurs, the defen-
dant has the right to appeal on the basis of misjoinder. In the appeal the burden 
of proof is on the defendant to show that joinder of offenses led to actual preju-
dice. In practice, the Appellate Court presumes that joinder was proper unless 
the defendant demonstrates that the joinder was based upon bad faith on the part 
of the prosecution or that the law was misinterpreted (United States v. Marzal-
kowski, 1982). All possible prejudicial risks, including the possibility of eviden-
tiary spillover from one charge to the other(s) or the implication of a criminal 
personality, are weighed against judicial economy. 
Interestingly, Appellate Courts require that the defendant demonstrate that 
the trial judge abused his discretionary powers when joinder was allowed. It is 
not sufficient that the defendant show that conviction would have been much less 
likely had the charges been severed (United States v. Thomas, 1982). Generally, 
if the evidence presented at the joined trial would have been admissible in the 
severed cases misjoinder is treated as "harmless error'1 (Georgetown, 1983). 
The discretionary powers given to the trial courts are rarely challenged by 
appellate courts. In practice reversals of convictions for failure to grant severance 
are rare (Loh, 1984). Indeed, reversal seems to require not only "inherent prej-
udice" but egregious prejudice. For example, in People v. Shapiro (1980), the 
appellate court held that joining the first indictment (64 counts of homosexual 
sodomitic acts) with two others (promoting prostitution and other sexual offenses) 
made conviction more likely based upon the assumption of criminal propensity 
(Loh, 1984). In this rare case the Appellate Court held that joining the first in-
dictment with the other two raised the probability of improper conviction. 
Clearly, the defendant is at a disadvantage when the issue of joinder of of-
fenses arises. Trial courts are hesitant to grant motions to sever and Appellate 
Courts rarely challenge the decision made at the trial court level. Only in those 
cases where joinder leads to obvious and flagrant prejudice will the courts grant 
a motion to sever offenses or an appeal based on misjoinder. 
The Court's Concern Over Joinder 
In Drew v. United States (1964) the court noted that the defendant could be 
prejudiced in several ways: the defendant may be confounded in presenting sep-
arate defenses, the jury might utilize evidence of one crime to infer a criminal 
disposition, or the jury might cumulate the evidence of the various crimes 
charged. 
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The leading case on joinder is U.S. v. Foutz (1976). The court mirrored the 
concerns expressed in the Drew decision by specifying the same sources of pos-
sible prejudice. In Foutz, the court went a step further in its reasoning and con-
sidered the possible impact and confounding of the evidentiary strength of each 
charge. In discussing the facts in Foutz, the court suggested that the jury likely 
had found the defendant guilty on the second, strong charge, and then inferred 
that as Foutz had commited robbery once, it was likely that he committed a 
robbery a second time. The result was that Foutz was convicted of both the strong 
second charge and the weaker first charge (Tanford, 1983). 
One method, as noted above, that the court system has used to eliminate the 
problem of joinder is to admonish the jury, through an instruction of law, to keep 
the evidence from each charge separate and reach independent verdicts. The 
Foutz court was not impressed with the efficacy of these instructions. The judges 
did not think that the standard juridic instructions were sufficient to eliminate the 
inherent prejudice arising from joinder. The instructions did not, in the court's 
view, exclude the possibility of intercharge confusion of evidence (Tanford, 1983). 
The court felt, at least in the Foutz case, that joinder was a prosecutorial con-
venience yielding increased convictions. 
Baron (1977) strongly recommends that multiple offenses only be joined if 
they arise out of a single criminal episode. However, "single criminal episode" 
appears to be an elusive concept. Courts have the discretion of defining a single 
criminal episode by focusing on the defendant's animus, or upon the interval 
between various criminal acts (Nowak and Key, 1982). 
Despite the concern expressed by Baron and the Appellate courts, the prac-
tice of joinder is widespread. The courts have not provided a concrete solution 
to the problems inherent in joining offenses. Perhaps empirical data generated 
from research will help the courts adequately deal with the problem. The lack of 
precision in the state statutes along with various court rulings have, in essence, 
given courts plenary discretion in determining joinder. 
Clearly, there are definitional and discretionary issues to be addressed by 
the legislatures. The role that behavioral scientists may play in this process is to 
offer crystalized advice to jurists as to (1) the prejudicial effects of joinder, (2) 
the psychological loci of the joinder effect, and (3) empirically based remedies 
for those circumstances in which the prejudicial effects of joinder are clear. 
It should be noted that while this paper is concerned with the effects of 
criminal joinder, parallel problems exist within civil law. Class action suits com-
bine various cases into one proceeding. Federal rule 42 specifies the parameters 
of the consolidation of civil cases. Again, in this instance, courts, special masters, 
and settlement judges are given what amounts to plenary powers. While civil 
joinder has special concerns and parameters of its own, the joinder effect should 
not be seen as limited to criminal cases. 
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to reviewing the current psy-
chological literature relating to the joinder effect. Whether the effect can be dem-
onstrated empirically, the locus of the effect and possible solutions based on the 
research are issues that will be discussed in separate sections below. 
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Joinder Research 
Two of the earliest research investigations of the joinder phenomenon were 
conducted by Kerr and Sawyers (1979) and Horowitz, Bordens, and Feldman 
(1980). Both studies clearly show that the practice of joining offenses leads to a 
bias against the defendant. Kerr and Sawyers (1979) had introductory psychology 
students read a brief summary of a criminal trial in which a defendant was charged 
with two offenses (robbery and receiving stolen property). Kerr and Sawyers 
varied the strength of the evidence on each charge (evidence either strongly or 
weakly linked the defendant with either crime), and the order in which the cases 
were judged by the subjects (the order in which the cases were presented was 
held constant). Kerr and Sawyers found that when the robbery case was adju-
dicated first its strength significantly affected the manner in which the receiving 
stolen property case was judged. When the robbery case was strong the proba-
bility of conviction on the receiving stolen property case was lower than if the 
robbery case was weak. Horowitz, Bordens, and Feldman (1980) had simulated 
jurors listen to an audiotaped summary of either joined or severed rape cases. In 
this study the strength of the evidence of the cases to be judged (clear for the 
prosecution or close) was varied along with the joined/severed trial mode. 
Horowitz et al. obtained a joinder effect for those cases presented in the first 
ordinal position in the joined trials. Comparisons between the first cases from 
joined trials with their severed counterparts showed that a defendant was rated 
as more guilty in the joined than severed trials. The joinder effect held regardless 
of the strength of the first or second cases. No effect of joinder was found for 
cases in the second position. 
The Kerr and Sawyers (1979) and Horowitz et al. (1980) studies demonstrated 
that the concern expressed by the court in the U.S. v. Foutz are well founded. 
In fact, joining criminal offenses into a single trial proceeding leads to an increased 
chance that the defendant will be convicted on at least one of the charges. 
Several recent studies have empirically verified the prejudicial effect of 
joinder or criminal offenses (Tanford & Penrod, 1982; Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; 
Greene & Loftus, 1983; Tanford, 1983). There exists a substantial body of re-
search demonstrating that a defendant is at a disadvantage when joinder of of-
fenses is allowed. It should be noted that the research on joinder has included 
studies using a variety of subject types (actual jurors vs. students), methods 
(deliberation vs. no deliberation), trial presentation modes (written, audiotaped, 
videotaped), and measures (continuous vs. dichotomous). For example, Tanford 
(1983) found that student jurors did not differ significantly from actual jurors and 
that jury deliberation did not significantly affect the joinder phenomenon. The 
various modes of presenting joined cases increases the confidence in the gener-
alizability of the joinder effect. The data for the most part confirm the court's 
reservations about the practice of joining criminal offenses that was expressed in 
the U.S. v. Foutz. The questions that still need to be examined are those that 
were brought up by the court regarding the mechanisms that underlie the biasing 
effect of joinder of offenses. 
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Loci of Prejudice in the Joinder Effect 
In U.S. v. Foutz (1976) the court speculated as to the possible sources of 
prejudice due to improper joinder of offenses. The Foutz decision specified four 
sources of potential prejudice: 
1. Confusion of evidence may occur since the jurors are hearing evidence 
surrounding more than one offense. 
2. Evidence may accumulate across multiple charges. 
3. A defendant may be confounded in his attempt to mount a defense to the 
multiple charges (e.g., if the defendant wishes to take the stand for one charge 
but not another). 
4. Because jurors are hearing evidence relating to more than one offense the 
jurors may be led to an inference that the defendant has a criminal disposition. 
In the following sections of the paper we will explore the research evidence 
relating to three of these issues. 
Confusion of Evidence 
The court's notion of confusion of evidence raises questions about the ability 
of jurors to keep the evidence from each isiultiple charge separate in memory. 
The court's concern about intercase confusion of evidence relates to a classic 
problem in psychology. The task facing a juror judging a joined trial is similar to 
the one facing a subject in a memory experiment who is required to learn two 
lists of words simultaneously and then recall items from one of the lists. The 
juror adjudicating a joined trial must"learn" evidence from each charge and later 
recall the evidence from each charge separately. In both instances there exists 
the possibility that interlist (intercase) confusion will occur. 
The theory of memory that best applies to the joinded trial situation is in-
terference theory. According to interference theory when a person learns material 
from two sources simultaneously intersource interference is likely to occur during 
recall. This interference would be manifested by having items of information from 
source 1 recalled as part of the recall of source 2 (and vice versa). Further, 
according to the list differentiation hypothesis (Underwood, cited in Hulse, Deese 
& Egeth, 1975), the more similar the information from the two sources the greater 
will be the intersource confusion. 
A similar process may operate when jurors must judge evidence from joined 
cases. Since the court will only allow joinder if the crimes are of the same or 
similar nature there may be a high degree of intercase evidentiary confusion. In 
joined trials where evidence is drawn from the same conceptual categories (for 
example, where both crimes are murders and the evidence from one may be 
similar to the evidence from a second) the jurors may not be able to keep the 
evidence from each charge separated in memory. 
Researchers interested in the joinder effect have investigated the role of 
memorial processes. For example, Tanford and Penrod (1982) had subjects recall 
evidence from each case in a joined trial. Tanford and Penrod found that there 
were intrusions from case to case on the measures of memory. They also found 
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that the percentage of intrusions (items of evidence from one charge that were 
incorrectly remembered as evidence from another charge) against the defendant 
(antidefendant intrusions) was affected by the number of cases included in the 
joined trial. There were also intrusions in favor of the defendant (prodefendant 
intrusions) when cases were joined for trial. 
Similarly, Bordens and Horowitz (1983) found that joinder of offenses leads 
to intercase confusion of evidence. In their study, Bordens and Horowitz manip-
ulated the strength of the cases judged (clear or close) as well as the similarity 
of the joined charges (rape-rape or rape-murder). Consistent with interference 
theory Bordens and Horowitz found that more confusion of evidence occurs when 
the joined charges are similar as opposed to dissimilar. The effect of case simi-
larity must be qualified since there was a significant charge similarity by strength 
of second case interaction. When the charges were the same the rate of antide-
fendant intrusions was high regardless of the strength of the evidence for the 
second charge. However, when the charges were dissimilar the rate of intrusions 
was still high if the second case was clear for the prosecution (but not if it was 
close). Confusion of evidence may occur even when the cases joined are not 
highly similar. 
It should be noted that not all of the joinder research has uncovered confusion 
of evidence. Greene and Loftus (1983), using a recognition memory task, found 
no significant confusion of evidence in their study. The lack of confusion of 
evidence in the Greene and Loftus study might stem from the fact that subjects 
read a brief summary of a case and then were administered a recognition task to 
remember evidence. The relative paucity of evidence may have made the cases 
easy to keep separated. Combined with the use of a sensitive measure of memory, 
the relatively unrealistic simulation may have been insensitive to confusion ef-
fects. 
The results from the Tanford and Penrod (1982) and Bordens and Horowitz 
(1983) studies largely confirm the fear expressed by the Foutz court concerning 
confusion of evidence. However, a critical issue still needs to be explored: Does 
memory confusion influence the jurors' verdict? 
Tanford and Penrod (1982) investigated the relationship between the degree 
of evidence confusion (evaluated with an evidence recognition task) and guilt 
judgments (a dichotomous guilty/not guilty measure) by correlating a difference 
score of the pro- and antidefendant intrusions with final verdicts. The correlations 
reported were small and nonsignificant. However, they were in the direction 
expected if confusion of evidence is related to verdicts. Similarly, Tanford (1983), 
Tanford and Penrod (1984), and Tanford, Penrod, and Collins (1985) also report 
low correlations between their measures of confusion and verdicts. Based upon 
their research Tanford and her associates have concluded that confusion of evi-
dence plays a minimal role in the joinder effect. In contrast, Bordens and 
Horowitz (1983), using a free recall memory task and a continuous measure of 
guilt judgment, found a significant moderate correlation between the transformed 
(arcsin) percentage of antidefendant intrusions and guilt judgments. Their results 
suggest that as the percentage of antidefendant intrusions increases so does the 
perceived guilt of the defendant. 
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The results of the series of studies reported by Tanford and her associates 
and those reported by Bordens and Horowitz (1983) are in conflict. The conflict 
between the Tanford studies and the Bordens and Horowitz may stem from at 
least two sources: Different measures of memory and different dependent vari-
ables. 
In the studies reported by Tanford and Penrod (1983) and Tanford, Penrod, 
and Collins (1985) the measure of memory employed was a recognition task. In 
contrast, Bordens and Horowitz (1983) used a free recall task. A juror may be 
better able to recognize an item of evidence as not belonging to a particular case 
than if the juror was required to freely recall evidence. The net effect would be 
that few intrusions would result. In fact, Tanford (1983) reported that the fre-
quency of intrusions was low and that there was little variability. The low vari-
ability in the memory measure may have contributed to an underestimation of 
the relationship between memory and verdicts (Roscoe, 1974). Where Tanford 
and her associates have used a free recall task to evaluate the impact of evidence 
confusion they have calculated difference score (prodefendant-antidefendant in-
trusions) that was then correlated with verdicts. This method also showed little 
or no correlation between evidentiary confusion and verdicts. However, the use 
of the difference score may have led to an underestimation of the correlation. It 
may be that such a difference score is unrelated to the raw percentages of anti-
defendant intrusions. 
Additionally, all of the Tanford studies have used the dichotomous guilty/not 
guilty verdict measure when attempting to correlate variables (e.g., memory) with 
guilt judgments (Bordens and Horowitz used a continuous measure of guilt). 
While the dichotomous measure does have high ecological validity the correlation 
calculated between a continuous measure and dichotomous measure tends to be 
conservative and to underestimate the degree of relationship between variables 
(Stenner, 1969). Combined with the use of a recognition task or a difference score 
the methods used by the Tanford studies may underestimate the degree of rela-
tionship between memory and guilt judgments. 
It is interesting to note that in the research reported above there were very 
few intrusions from one case to another in joined trials. This raises an interesting 
question about a second aspect of evidentiary confusion. In all of the relevant 
joinder research the problem of intrusions was approached from a quantitative 
perspective (the number or percentage of intrusions). No study has directly ad-
dressed the qualitative nature of the intrusions. That is, were the intrusions ob-
served of high or low probative value? One could certainly envision a situation 
in which a single piece of evidence from one case intrudes on the memory of a 
second and has a great effect on guilt judgments (e.g., a fingerprint on a gun). 
Future research might address not only the issue of the quantity of the intrusions 
but also the quality. 
In summary, the available evidence lends support to the notion that jurors 
may confuse the evidence from multiple charges in joined trials. However, the 
research is equivocal on whether there is a strong relationship between measures 
of confusion (intrusions) and guilt assessments. Owing to the methodological 
differences between the major joinder studies it is not possible to clearly deter-
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mine what, if any, role evidentiary confusion plays in the joinder effect. Research 
using ecologically valid measures of memory should be conducted to disentangle 
the contradictory results that now exist. 
Accumulation of Evidence 
In the Foutz decision the court also expressed the concern that evidence 
might accumulate across cases in a joined trial. In essence the court was con-
cerned that the evidence from one case may serve to reinforce the evidence in 
another. The concern is that a given piece (or pieces) of evidence within a par-
ticular case will be seen as strong if the case is placed within the context of a 
joined trial rather than tried alone. 
Tanford (1983) has found that joinder of offenses influenced subjects' ratings 
of both prosecution and defense evidence. Juror-subjects were asked to rate the 
evidence presented by the prosecution and defense on nine-point scales (1 = 
strongly indicates innocence, 9 = strongly indicates guilt). Comparisons were 
made between joined and severed versions of the cases. Tanford found that the 
ratings of the prosecution evidence were higher in the joined than severed cases. 
Also, the defense evidence was rated lower in the joined than severed cases. 
Tanford's data then are consistent with the notion that jurors use evidence from 
one case to reinforce the evidence from a second, thus accumulating the evidence 
across cases. 
Research reported by Bordens and Horowitz (1983) does not support the 
data provided by Tanford (1983). Bordens and Horowitz asked subjects to write 
down their "thoughts" about the case(s) heard. Those subjects were also asked 
to rate the degree to which those thoughts favored either the prosecution or 
defense. It might be predicted that if accumulation of evidence is taking place 
across cases in a joined trial that the ratings of the cognitions associated with the 
prosecution's case would be more favorable towards the prosecution in the joined 
than severed cases. The results showed that joinder of offenses did not sig-
nificantly affect the ratings of the antidefendant cognitions. Hence, these data do 
not lend support to the notion that jurors accumulate evidence across cases in a 
joined trial. 
It is not possible to state clearly whether or not accumulation does occur 
based upon these two studies. Both studies were carefully designed and executed. 
However, certain differences were evident in the nature of the samples used in 
the studies and the methodology. For example, Bordens and Horowitz had sub-
jects rate their own thoughts about the cases and Tanford had subjects rate the 
overall strength of the prosecution and defensive evidence as well as preselected 
items of evidence. Since Bordens and Horowitz did not have subjects directly 
assess the strength of evidence their data may not be a true test of accumulation 
of evidence over joined trials. Additionally, the data reported by Tanford (1983) 
and Bordens and Horowitz (1983) are not as disparate as they seem. Tanford 
reported changes in the ratings of evidence as a function of joinder that were 
significant but small in magnitude. Hence, if joinder does affect ratings of evi-
dence its impact is small. Clearly, more research is indicated to help clarify the 
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role of accumulation of evidence in joined trials. However, given the null findings 
reported by Bordens and Horowitz and the small effect reported by Tanford 
research into accumulation may prove to be less fruitful than research into other 
causes for the joinder effect. 
Inferences About the Character of The Defendant 
In the U.S. vs. Foutz the court also expressed a concern that in joined trials 
the jury would infer that the defendant has a criminal disposition based upon the 
knowledge of the multiple charges. The court has expressed the concern that the 
jury would develop a systematic bias against the defendant because of the multiple 
charges. The mere knowledge of multiple charges may establish a perception of 
consistency of behavior, thus making it easier to attribute the crimes to the de-
fendant. 
Two recent studies addressed the problem of jurors drawing an inference that 
the defendant has a criminal personality (Tanford, 1983; Greene & Loftus, 1983). 
Each of these studies shows that jurors do, in fact, infer that the defendant has 
a criminal disposition when cases are joined as opposed to severed. 
Greene and Loftus (1983) had juror-subjects rate a defendant tried for mul-
tiple offenses on three dimensions: dangerousness, likeableness, and believability. 
Greene and Loftus found that when a defendant was tried for multiple offense in 
a single trial he was seen as more dangerous, less likeable, and less believable 
than a defendant tried on separate offenses. Hence, the jurors were likely to form 
a different opinion of the defendant's character based upon the nature of the trial 
(joined vs. severed). 
Tanford (1983) also investigated the impact of joinder on inferences about the 
defendant. Tanford had juror-subjects rate the defendant on 11 separate nine-
point rating scales representing different trait and behavioral dimensions (e.g., 
honest-dishonest, dangerous-not dangerous, future crime likely-future crime 
not likely, typical criminal-not typical criminal). A factor analysis revealed two 
major dimensions: criminality-credibility and a global evaluation factor. Tanford 
analyzed these data by calculating factor scores for the two dimensions and 
looking at how each was affected by joinder. It was found that subjects tended 
to rate the defendant less favorably on the criminality-credibility and global 
evaluation dimensions in the joined than severed trials. These data, according to 
Tanford, "offer strong support for the prediction that joinder leads to negative 
inferences about the defendant" (p. 44). Based upon the results of a path analysis, 
Tanford concluded that the negative inferences generated about the defendant as 
a result of joinder serve as a "criminal schema" that influences later judgments 
of the evidence. The implication of Tanford's data is that the criminal schema is 
activated relatively early in the judgment process and serves to influence how 
evidence is perceived later in the judgment process. 
Tanford's (1983) results, while intriguing, may not present an accurate picture 
of the causal relationship between inferences of criminality and guilt judgments. 
Tanford's study was not designed to experimentally test the causal relationship 
between the formation of a "criminal schema" and guilt verdicts. Instead, a 
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correlational path analytic approach in which ratings of the defendant's character 
were obtained after verdicts were assigned was used. The dangers of using path 
analysis to infer causality in situations similar to Tanford's study have been dis-
cussed by Spaeth (1975) and Kim and Kohout (1975). The temporal ordering of 
judgments concerning the defendant and guilt cannot be clearly established from 
Tanford's data. Tanford favors the idea that the "criminal schema" is formed 
early which causes changes in how the evidence is perceived and the subsequent 
judgment of guilt. However, it could as easily be argued that after assigning guilt 
the subjects reasoned that the defendant had a criminal personality and reeval-
uated the evidence. Tanford does acknowledge the limitations of using the path 
analysis and does use existing research on impression formation to support her 
causal model. Such a strategy certainly provides an interesting base on which 
future experimental tests of the criminal schema model could be built. 
Additionally, there is little direct evidence on when the "criminal schema" 
is activated. However, data reported by Tanford and Penrod (1982) suggest that 
the schema is not activated until relatively late in the trial. Tanford and Penrod 
had subjects provide a prior probability of the defendant's guilt based only on 
knowledge of the nature of the charge(s). Tanford and Penrod found that joinder 
of offenses did not significantly affect subjects' estimates that the defendant com-
mitted the crime(s). If, as Tanford (1983) suggests, the criminal schema is a key 
(if only indirect) mediator of the joinder effect (rather than a by-product of it) it 
might be expected that its impact would be seen as soon as the juror learns that 
the defendant has been charged with multiple offenses and before any evidence 
is presented. 
Tanford's results, along with the results reported by Greene and Loftus, 
provide an interesting starting point for further investigation of the problem of 
the effects of criminal inferences about the defendant on guilt judgments. There 
is enough social psychological theory and research (e.g., attribution theory) to 
suggest a relationship between inferences about the defendant and guilt judg-
ments. However, neither study clearly and unambiguously establishes a causal 
link between such inferences of criminality and guilt judgments. Experiments 
could easily be constructed that would directly test the impact of joinder on 
inferences of criminality. For example, a study could be conducted in which guilt 
ratings are obtained at various points in a joined trial (e.g., after finding out about 
the multiple charges, after presenting the evidence from the first case, etc.). Such 
research could address the issue of where in the judgment process the "criminal 
schema" is developed and how it might affect the perception of the evidence. 
SUMMARY 
The empirical research has shown clearly that the practice of joinder of 
offenses is prejudicial towards the defendant (although the magnitude of the 
joinder effect is often small). Defendants are more likely to be convicted on a 
given charge when that charge is tried within the context of a joined rather than 
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severed trial. Tanford, Penrod, and Collins (1985) have statistically combined 
the results of seven experimental studies on joinder. Following Rosenthal (1978) 
they computed an overall joinder effect for these studies and found a highly 
significant result. The pattern across these studies indicates a very robust effect 
of joinder of offenses. The research therefore demonstrates that the concerns of 
the court expressed in the U.S. vs. Foutz are well founded. In general there is 
evidence to show that jurors do confuse and accumulate evidence and do draw 
criminal personality inferences in joined trials. 
Still unclear is the exact model that describes the underlying mechanisms 
that cause the joinder effect. The research reported by Bordens and Horowitz 
(1983) favors a cognitive processing approach focusing on the manner in which 
evidence is stored, manipulated and retrieved from memory. On the other hand 
the research reported by Tanford and Penrod (1982) and Tanford (1983) favors a 
more social psychological approach stressing the role of criminal inferences 
drawn about the defendant and how they relate to judgments of guilt. 
At this point in time, given the conflicting nature of the research evidence, 
it is not possible to offer any concrete ideas on which of the court's concerns 
over joinder is most valid. Each of the three sources of prejudice discussed above 
has a firm base in psychological theory and research. Clearly more research 
centering upon the issues discussed above is needed before we can state conclu-
sively what the loci of the joinder effect might be. 
Directions for Future Research on Joinder of Offenses 
Whatever the mechanism underlying the joinder effect, it is clear that the 
effect of joining multiple offenses in a single trial is a robust one and does increase 
the likelihood of a defendant being found guilty. We feel confident that the joinder 
effect is a valid reflection of the true state of affairs. The effect has been shown 
in a variety of studies employing different techniques and subject populations. 
Furthermore, while decision making is clearly dependent upon the context in 
which it occurs, the simulated trial contexts and the requirements of human 
decision making in the laboratory studies represent a reasonable approximation 
of juror decision making in a courtroom setting. 
As social scientists we would like to be able to offer the courts concrete 
advice on how to attenuate the impact of joinder of offenses. Unfortunately, the 
state of the research at the present time does not allow such advice. If, for 
example, inferences of criminality mediate the joinder effect then all multiple 
offense trials would be prejudicial to the defendant. This would be especially true 
of those trials in which many charges are joined. On the other hand, if the major 
factor contributing to the effect is confusion of evidence then a case management 
approach (discussed briefly below) would seem to be the way to reduce the 
prejudicial effects of joinder. Before any conclusions about possible remedies can 
be made we need to isolate the loci of the joinder effect more clearly than is 
currently the case. 
Once the loci of the joinder effect have been identified further research could 
focus on potential remedies to the prejudicial effect of joining multiple offenses. 
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Research could focus on several areas: pretrial case management (including using 
a bifurcated trial system), juror instructions and juror education. 
There is a precedent, found in civil law, for considering the possibility of 
creative pretrial case management. Complex, multitort cases have necessitated 
innovative techniques to bring the issues before the bar. One such technique 
involves the use of multiple and separate juries. Juries are impanneled in a mass 
voir dire, hear common core issues, and then each jury is assigned to hear the 
presentations of a few of the plaintiffs (Rosenberg, 1984). A similar procedure 
could be used in the criminal arena. Multiple juries could be impanneled to hear 
multiple cases. Multiple juries have, in fact, been used in very lengthy criminal 
cases in lieu of granting a motion for severance. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court in United States v. Hayes (1982) upheld a trial court's decision to impannel 
multiple juries, each assigned to one of the defendants who were tried together. 
The Circuit Court held that the dual jury guaranteed a fair trial while preserving 
judicial economy. It may be that trial courts would find such multiple jury trials 
to be permissible when the evidence is complicated or highly similar across mul-
tiple offenses. The duplication of trials would be avoided while the defendant's 
rights would be protected. 
In the area of judicial instructions, most of the existing research suggests 
that limiting instructions have little effect on the joinder effect (e.g., Tanford and 
Penrod, 1982). However, Tanford, Penrod, and Collins (1985) have reported 
that a carefully designed set of instructions may have an effect on joinder of 
offenses under certain conditions. Future research could systematically focus on 
the parameters of judicial instructions that would make them more effective in 
reducing juror bias. If such instructions could be constructed they may reduce 
joinder-related bias regardless of the locus of the effect. 
Finally, in the area of pretrial juror education, research could focus on the 
effectiveness of making the jurors aware of the importance of following judicial 
instructions to keep the evidence from multiple charges separate and reach in-
dependent verdicts. Such an education could be made part of already existing 
procedures (e.g., films, mild lectures concerning the role of the jury, etc.) used 
to socialize jurors into the legal system. Such a remedy would be predicated on 
the idea that forewarning jurors about the potential bias inherent in joinder would 
help to eliminate the bias. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that research is needed in two areas: Further research on the loci 
of the joinder effect is needed to resolve some of the conflicts in the present 
literature. It is only after we understand the locus of the effect that we can begin 
to offer the court concrete, crystalized advice on remedies. Also, research is 
required to test the implications of various remedial steps. Major research ques-
tions should center around the impact of implementing the remedies and which 
remedies are the most efficient (in terms of both judicial conservation and safe-
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guarding the rights of the defendant). Additionally, we would also be interested 
in knowing if the proposed remedies create a host of new, previously nonexistent, 
sources of bias. Ideally, a remedy should eliminate the joinder effect while not 
creating any new problems for the judicial system. 
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Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: 
The Influence of Charge Similarity, 
Evidence Similarity, and 
Limiting Instructions* 
Sarah Tanford,t Steven Penrod, and Rebecca Collins^ 
The present research investigated decision-making processes in "'joined" trials of multiple offenses. 
Subjects judged videotaped trials of three joined charges in a factorial design that varied charge 
similarity, evidence similarity, and judges' instructions designed to reduce judgment biases; or judged 
one of several charges presented individually. The results indicated that subjects were more likely to 
convict a defendant in a joined trial than on the same charge tried by itself, particularly when the 
charge was presented in the third position. Convictions were more frequent when joined charges were 
similar, and judges' instructions significantly reduced conviction rates. Subjects judging joined trials 
confused evidence among charges, rated the prosecution's evidence as stronger, and rated the defen-
dent less favorably than subjects judging single trials. The findings were compared statistically to the 
results of previous research, and it was concluded that increased convictions in joined trials are robust 
effects. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule H(a). Joinder of Offenses. Two or more 
offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for 
each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies, or misdemeanors, or both, are 
of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two 
or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a common scheme 
or plan. 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 14. Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. If it 
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appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder of offenses . . . in 
an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order 
an election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance . . . or provide whatever other 
relief justice requires. 
The issue of "joinder of offenses" poses a problem for the courts, since 
joining multiple charges as provided by FRCP Rule 8(a) may result in prejudice 
to a defendant contemplated by Rule 14. Until recently, the bulk of our knowledge 
about the nature of this prejudice came from a body of appellate court opinions 
in which judges relied on "armchair psychology" to decide whether joinder was 
or was not prejudicial in a particular case. Traditionally the courts have recognized 
three potential sources of prejudice to a defendant in a joined trial: (1) confusion 
of evidence among charges, (2) accumulation of evidence across charges and (3) 
juror inferences about the defendant's "criminal disposition" (United States v. 
Foutz, 1976). 
Recently, however, psychological researchers have investigated the joinder 
issue experimentally using written or audiotaped trial summaries. Bordens and 
Horowitz (1983), Green and Loftus (1985), Horowitz, Bordens, and Feldman 
(1980), and Kerr and Sawyers (1979) all found that a defendant was more likely 
to be convicted on a particular charge in a joined trial than on the same charge 
tried alone, although Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Horowitz et al. (1980) 
found that this effect occurred primarily for charges presented in the first rather 
than the second position. Tanford and Penrod (1982) used trials containing a single 
charge or two, three, or four joined offenses, and found that the probability of 
conviction on a particular charge increased as a function of the number of charges 
with which it was joined. 
Empirical research on joinder also provides evidence pertaining to each of 
the three legal theories of prejudice: confusion, accumulation, and criminal in-
ference. Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Tanford and Penrod (1982) both found 
that joinder led to recall intrusions of facts from one charge to another, supporting 
the theory of confusion of evidence. However, Bordens and Horowitz found that 
confusion was related to guilt judgments, whereas Tanford and Penrod found that 
it was not. Tanford and Penrod found that subjects judging joined trials rated the 
evidence as more incriminating than subjects judging a single trial, supporting an 
accumulation of evidence process, whereas Bordens and Horowitz found that 
ratings of thoughts generated against the defendant (a different measure of evi-
dence strength) did not differ in joined and single conditions. However, both 
Bordens and Horowitz and Tanford and Penrod found that perceptions of evidence 
strength were strongly related to guilt judgments. Greene and Loftus (1985) and 
Tanford and Penrod (1982) found that joinder led to unfavorable ratings of the 
defendant's character, and that these ratings were strongly related to subjects' 
guilt judgments. 
The legal remedy for prejudicial joinder is an instruction given by the judge 
at the end of the trial designed to alleviate potential biases. Tanford and Penrod 
(1982) found that instructions to consider charges separately did not significantly 
reduce convictions in joined trials, but they used a rather weak and artificial 
instruction manipulation. Using a more realistic manipulation, Greene and Loftus 
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(1985) found that the standard multiple-offense cautionary instruction used in 
Washington State courts also failed to reduce conviction biases, regardless of 
whether the instruction came at the start or the end of the trial. 
Tanford and Penrod (1984) addressed the applied and theoretical limitations 
of previous research on joinder in a study designed to (1) focus on the psycho-
logical mechanisms underlying joinder effects, (2) provide guidance to judges in 
their decisions about when to join charges, and (3) maximize external validity in 
order to enhance the study's applied significance. Previous studies used written 
(Greene & Loftus, 1985; Kerr & Sawyers, 1979; Tanford & Penrod, 1982) or 
audiotaped (Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; Horowitz et al., 1980) trial summaries 
as stimulus materials, whereas Tanford and Penrod (1984) used videotaped trial 
reenactments. All previous joinder research used undergraduate subjects, 
whereas Tanford and Penrod used adults previously summoned for jury duty, two-
thirds of whom had actually served on one or more cases. Also unlike previous 
researchers, Tanford and Penrod (1984) included group deliberation in their pro-
cedures. Qualified jurors judged a realistic videotaped trial containing a particular 
4
'target" charge tried by itself or in a joined trial with two other offenses that 
varied as a function of (1) charge similarity, (2) evidence similarity and (3) judges 
instructions designed to alleviate joinder-induced biases. The instruction manip-
ulation was stronger than the standard instruction employed by Greene and 
Loftus (1985), and contained elements corresponding to each of the three legal 
theories of prejudice. 
The results indicated that (1) the probability of conviction on the target 
charge (which was the same in all conditions) was higher in a joined trial than on 
the same charge tried by itself, (2) convictions increased regardless of the simi-
larity of the charges or the evidence in the joined charges, and (3) instructions 
had no effect on conviction rates. In terms of the hypothesized sources of prej-
udice, Tanford and Penrod found that joinder led to (a) confusion of evidence on 
a recognition task, (b) strengthened perceptions of prosecution evidence strength 
and weakened perceptions of defense evidence strength, and (c) less favorable 
impressions of the defendant on dimensions of criminality (as indexed by several 
ratings by credibility and criminal tendency) and global evaluations (measured by 
ratings of goodness, nervousness, dangerousness, and attractiveness). As in their 
previous research (Tanford & Penrod, 1982), Tanford and Penrod (1984) found 
that confusion was unrelated to verdicts, whereas defendant and evidence ratings 
were related to verdicts, as well as to each other. 
Based on social cognition research (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Higgins, Herman 
& Zanna, 1981; Nisbett & Ross, 1980), Tanford and Penrod (1984) proposed a 
single explanatory model to account for their findings, and tested the model 
with path analytic techniques. The results suggested that the three processes of 
confusion, accumulation, and criminal inference, as well as the inefficacy of 
judges' instructions, can be interpreted in terms of impression formation pro-
cesses (Asch, 1946; Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, 1979). Tanford and Penrod 
intepreted their results as indicating that joinder fosters a negative impression of 
the defendant that influences (1) memory for evidence (leading to confusion 
among charges); (2) perceptions of the evidence, which may be distorted in a 
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manner consistent with the impression (i.e., the prosecution evidence appears 
stronger, the defense evidence weaker); and (3) inferences about the causes of 
the defendant's behavior based on his criminal character. This process leads to 
an impression of greater guilt in a joined trial which is quite resistant to change, 
and therefore joinder increases conviction rates both with and without instruc-
tions (Tanford & Penrod, 1984). 
Support for a similar idea in a related jury context was obtained by Pysz-
czynski, Greenberg, Mack, and Wrightsman (1981) and Pyszczynski and 
Wrightsman (1981). Pyszczynski et al. argued that attorneys' opening statements 
are crucial aspects of the trial, since they create thematic frameworks (Lingle & 
Ostrom, 1980) or schemata (Barlett, 1932; Taylor & Crocker, 1981), which affect 
the way in which subsequent trial evidence is evaluated. In two studies (Pysz-
czynski, Greenberg, Mack, and Wrightsman, 1981; Pyszczynski & Wrightsman, 
1981), opening statements were manipulated to create predispositions towards 
guilt or innocence, and these predispositions had a strong effect on verdicts even 
when the evidence did not support the opening statement. Additional evidence 
for the importance of first impressions was obtained in a study by Kassin and 
Wrightsman (1979), in which judges' instructions on reasonable doubt affected 
verdicts when the instructions were presented at the start of the trial, but had no 
effect when presented at the end of the trial. 
Research on the effect of prior convictions has psychological implications 
similar to those raised by the joinder issue. A number of studies have found that 
when evidence of a defendant's prior criminal record is introduced, subjects are 
more likely to convict the defendant (Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1973; Hans & Doob, 
1976; Sealy & Cornish, 1973; Wissler & Saks, 1985). Legally, evidence of prior 
convictions is sometimes admissible when witness credibility is at issue, but ju-
rors are not to use the information to decide guilt. However, in the above studies, 
limiting instructions to use the record information to judge credibility but not guilt 
were ineffective. Moveover, Wissler and Saks (1985) found that prior record did 
not affect credibility assessments, although it did influence guilt judgments. Prior 
convictions could operate psychologically in a manner similar to multiple charges, 
since both suggest that the defendant has been involved in other crimes. In either 
case, jurors may form an unfavorable impression of the defendant, which influ-
ences the way they process other trial information. 
Conflicts in Existing Research 
The joinder research reviewed above strongly indicates that joinder can in-
fluence judgments, but there are a number of inconsistencies among different 
studies. First, Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Horowitz et al. (1980) found that 
joinder primarily increased convictions on the first, rather than the second, of 
two charges; whereas Greene and Loftus (1985), Kerr and Sawyers (1979), and 
Tanford and Penrod (1982) found that joinder increased convictions regardless of 
charge position. A potential explanation for this discrepancy is the strength of 
the cases used, although a direct comparison of case strength across studies is 
not possible since different researchers employed different measures of conviction 
rate. However, it appears that Bordens and Horowitz and Horowitz et al. used 
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stronger cases than those used by other researchers. The mean conviction rate 
obtained on nonjoined cases was 4.01 in the Bordens and Horowitz study and 
4.0 in the Horowitz et al. study, measured on six-point scales where points 4, 5, 
and 6 represented degrees of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (all three points 
were labeled guilty verdicts). Tanford and Penrod (1982) used much weaker cases, 
obtaining approximately 10% convictions across several nonjoined cases. Greene 
and Loftus obtained ''conviction scores" ranging from 29% to 43% on severed 
cases. However, conviction was defined as ratings of 5, 6, and 7 on a 7-point 
scale, indicating that the defendant was either possibly (5), probably (6), or def-
initely (7) guilty, so these ratings are probably higher than would have been ob-
tained if subjects were asked whether the defendant was guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, which is the standard of proof in a criminal trial. Thus it appears that 
Greene and Loftus also used relatively weak cases. Additional evidence that 
joinder effects are strong when cases are weak was obtained by Kerr and Sawyers 
(1979), who found that joinder increased convictions on a weak robbery charge 
(with a 25% conviction rate when it was not joined) but not a strong one (75% 
nonjoined convictions). 
Greene and Loftus (1985) interpreted their finding of increased convictions 
on charges in either position as suggesting that the biasing effects of joinder occur 
at the time the verdict is reached. If the effect occurred instead during the pro-
cessing of trial information, Greene and Loftus argue that a "spillover effect" of 
evidence from the first to the second joined charge should increase convictions 
on the second charge, relative to the first. However, Greene and Loftus also 
found that joinder led to negative impressions of the defendant, so their research 
lends itself equally well to an impression-based interpretation such as the one 
proposed by Tanford and Penrod (1984). If the impresson is formed at the 
outset of the trial, it should influence processing of information from both joined 
charges. The present research investigates this issue further by examining judg-
ments on a number of different joined charges in the first, second, and third 
positions. 
A second discrepancy between studies is the relationship between memory 
and verdicts. Tanford and Penrod (1982) obtained a nonsignificant positive cor-
relation between free recall intrusions and verdicts (mean r = .16), and Tanford 
and Penrod (1984) obtained a zero correlation between recognition intrusions 
and verdicts. Bordens and Horowitz (1983) found that free recall intrusions 
against, but not in favor of, the defendant were significantly related to convictions 
(r values not provided). Research on memory-judgment relationships in other 
domains indicates that memory for specific items of information is not strongly 
related to overall impressions (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben, Fiske, & 
Hastie, 1979; Riskey, 1979). Bordens and Horowitz do not describe their recall 
task in detail, but it is possible that the task was structured in a manner conducive 
to recall of judgment-relevant information, particularly against the defendant 
(which should be more relevant to guilt determinations). However, the reasons 
for the discrepancies between memory-judgment relationships obtained in ex-
isting research are far from clear, and the present research explores this issue 
further. 
A third discrepancy concerns the effects of joinder on perceptions of the 
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evidence. Tanford and Penrod (1982, 1984) found that joinder increased sub-
jects' perceptions of evidence strength, measured on scales from weak to strong 
as well as innocence to guilt. On the other hand, Bordens and Horowitz found 
that ratings of the favorableness of subject-generated thoughts against the defen-
dant did not differ in joined and single trials, although subjects did generate more 
antidefendant thoughts when charges were joined. The rating method used by 
Bordens and Horowitz may not have measured subjects' perceptions of evidence 
strength directly; and, as noted earlier, Bordens and Horowitz employed cases 
with stronger evidence to begin with, so there may have been less room for an 
increase in perceptions of its strength. The present research examines the effects 
of joinder on multiple measures of evidence strength. 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
The objective of the present research was to extend the findings of Tanford 
and Penrod (1984), and to resolve conflicting findings obtained by other re-
searchers. Tanford and Penrod (1984) obtained significant joinder effects using 
representative jurors in a realistic trial setting including group deliberation. How-
ever, as a result of the effort to achieve a high degree of external validity, Tanford 
and Penrod did not have sufficient resources to examine a complete factorial 
design, and in every instance jurors' judgments were on a particular "target" 
charge that came first in the joined sequence. The present study replicated the 
conditions employed by Tanford and Penrod (1984) using undergraduates who did 
not deliberate, and included a number of additional experimental conditions to 
produce a more complete design. 
The study used a full factorial design manipulating charge similarity, evidence 
similarity, and judges' instructions. From an applied standpoint, similarity was 
considered an important variable because it is a criterion currently used by the 
courts as a basis for joinder decisions. From a theoretical perspective, similarity 
was predicted to influence the three processes of confusion, accumulation, and 
criminal inference. Although previous research demonstrates that joinder instruc-
tions (Greene & Loftus, 1985; Tanford & Penrod, 1984) as well as judges' instruc-
tions in other domains (Lind, 1982) tend not to be effective, the legal presumption 
is that instructions will work; thus the instruction issue continues to be an im-
portant one. The present research investigated the possibility that a strong and 
carefully constructed instruction that did not affect actual jurors (Tanford & 
Penrod, 1984) might in fact influence undergraduate subjects. 
In addition to the target offense control group, single-offense control groups 
for the second and third charge in each joined condition were included in the 
design. The additional control groups served two purposes: (1) to examine joinder 
effects on the other, nontarget charges, and thereby examine the generality of the 
phenomenon, and (2) to investigate the magnitude of joinder effects as a function 
of the position of the charge in the joined sequence, as opposed to the first charge 
only. 
DECISION MAKING IN JOINED TRIALS 325 
METHOD 
Subjects. Subjects were 374 undergraduates at the University of Wisconsin 
who received course credit for participation. The sample was two-thirds female 
and one-third male, and subjects' mean age was 19 years. 
Design. The design of the experiment is presented in Table 1. The study used 
a 3 {charge similarity: identical, similar or dissimilar) x 2 {evidence similarity: 
similar or dissimilar) x 2 instructions present or absent) between-subjects design. 
Each of the 12 experimental (joined) groups contained the same offense (desig-
nated the tktarget offense") in combination with two other offenses that repre-
sented the experimental manipulations. In addition, 13 single-case control groups 
were run, consisting of the target control group (which was the first charge in all 
joined conditions), six single-case control groups corresponding to the second 
charge in each joined condition, and six single-case control groups corresponding 
to the third charge in each joined condition. The content of the control tapes was 
identical to the content of the offense when presented in the joined trial. 
The independent variables were defined as follows: Charge similarity was 
defined as the type of crime and the circumstances surrounding the crime, where 
identical charges were three service station burglaries, similar charges were three 
burglaries committed at different establishments, and dissimilar charges were 
burglary, assault and armed robbery charges. Evidence similarity was defined as 
the main evidence presented in each case by the prosecution. For similar evidence 
conditions the evidence for each charge was circumstantial evidence that the 
defendant was seen driving suspiciously near the scene around the time of the 
crime with no explanation for his whereabouts. For dissimilar evidence conditions 
the main evidence was different for each charge. 
Judges1 instructions were defined as special joinder instructions given by the 
Single conditions 
Table 1. Experimental Design0 
Joined conditions 
Charges Evidence 
Target 
control Second charge 
group control groups 
§? 
B, 1 B2 2 b , 3 b 2 4 A,
5 A,6 
Third charge 
control groups 
B, 1 B3 2 bi
 3 bi 4 V R36 
Identical Similar Dissimilar 
B.B, B, » 
Hi B2 B3 2 
B, b, bi 3 
B, b2 b$ 4 
B, A, R, 5 
B, A2 R3 6 
B . B . B , 7 
k B2 B3 8 
B, b, bi 9 
B, b2 bi ,0 
B ^ R , " 
B, A2 R3 ,2 
Similar 
Dissimilar 
Similar 
Dissimilar 
No instructions 
[instructions 
a
 Charge codes: B, burglary (service station); b, burglary (residence); b \ burglary (business); A, 
assault; R, robbery. Evidence codes: 1, circumstantial evidence; 2, eyewitness identification; 3, 
other evidence (fingerprints, informant, or stolen property). 
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judge along with the regular jury instructions at the end of the trial. The instruc-
tion was an elaborated and strengthened version of the typical instruction given 
in actual joined cases. The purpose of the instruction was to alleviate each of the 
three hypothesized sources of prejudice from joinder. The instruction manipula-
tion was presented by the trial judge as follows (the type of prejudice addressed 
by each portion is indicated in parentheses): 
1. The defendant is charged with three counts (of burglary—similar charge conditions) 
(that is, with the counts of burglary, battery, and armed robbery—dissimilar charge 
conditions). These are separate crimes and the prosecutor is charging that the defendant 
committed all of them. The fact that the defendant is charged with more than one crime 
is not evidence against him. (criminal inference) 
2. Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. You 
should treat the evidence from each charge as separate and distinct, (confusion) 
3. It is for you to determine whether the defendant is guilty of one, two, three, or none 
of the offenses charged. The fact that you may find the accused guilty or not guilty as 
to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense 
charged. In deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence on a particular charge, you 
should consider the evidence pertaining to that charge only, and you should not consider 
the evidence from the other two charges. Each count charges a separate crime, and you 
must consider each one separately, (accumulation) 
Stimulus Materials. The same videotaped trial reenactments employed by 
Tanford and Penrod (1984) were used in the present study. The cases were 
based on burglary, assault, and armed robbery cases tried in Wisconsin. Two 
experienced trial attorneys served as the attorneys in the reenactments, and wit-
nesses were student and staff volunteers. Each case was filmed individually at 
the University of Wisconsin Law School courtroom. The joined conditions were 
created by editing together combinations of three charges each, all of which 
contained the same ''target'' offense (presented first) in combination with two 
other charges (presented second and third), which represented the experimental 
manipulations. The joined conditions were presented in the form a joined trial is 
actually conducted (prosecution opening statements for each of the three charges, 
defense opening statements, direct and cross-examination of prosecution wit-
nesses for each charge, questioning of defense witnesses, prosecution closing 
arguments, defense closing argument, judges' instructions). The target offense 
presented as a single trial constituted the control group for the first charge in 
each condition, and 12 additional single trial tapes served as controls for the 
second and third charges (which were different in each condition). Joined trial 
tapes lasted from IV2 to 2 hours, and single trials lasted from 30 to 45 minutes. 
Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 25 experimental^ 
conditions, with 11 to 21 subjects per cell (mean n = 15). Subjects viewed the 
trial videotape in small groups, and following the trial individually completed a 
posttrial questionnaire which contained the dependent measures. Experimental 
sessions lasted from 1 to 2V2 hours. 
Dependent Measures. (1) Manipulation checks—Subjects in joined condi-
tions rated the similarity of the three charges, as well as the evidence contained-
in the charges, on discrete scales from 1 (highly similar) and 9 (highly dissimilar).? 
(2) Verdict—Subjects provided a dichotomous verdict preference (guilty or 
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not guilty). From a legal standpoint, verdict is clearly the most important depen-
dent variable. 
(3) Certainty—Subjects rated the degree of certainty in their verdicts on a 
scale from 1 (extremely uncertain) to 9 (extremely certain). 
(4) Evidence recognition—Subjects were given a multiple choice recognition 
task and were asked to choose which facts were contained in the target charge 
from among (a) correct items actually contained in the target offense, (b) factual 
errors about the target offense and (c) items from the other two nontarget charges 
which were attributed to target offense witnesses ("intrusions"). These items 
constituted a measure of confusion. 
(5) Evidence ratings—Subjects were asked to rate the strength of the evi-
dence for prosecution and defense overall on scales from 1 (very weak) to 9 (very 
strong). Subjects were also asked to rate the incriminating value of four specific 
items of evidence for the target charge, two for prosecution and two for defense, 
on scales from 1 (strongly indicates innocence) to 9 (strongly indicates guilt). The 
evidence ratings provided a measure of accumulation of evidence. 
(6) Defendant ratings—Subjects were asked to rate the defendant on the 
following eleven 9-point bipolar scales: honest-dishonest, dangerous-not dan-
gerous, likeable-dislikeable, good-bad, sincere-insincere, believable-unbeliev-
able, calm-nervous, moral-immoral, attractive-unattractive, future crime 
likely-unlikely, a typical criminal-not a typical criminal. The direction of positive 
and negative poles (1 or 9) was evenly balanced to avoid any response bias. The 
purpose of these measures was to assess inferences about the defendant's dis-
position. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Manipulation Checks. Responses to the charge and evidence similarity rat-
ings were analyzed in 3 (charge similarity) x 2 (evidence similarity) x 2 (instruc-
tions) analyses of variance. For the charge similarity rating there was a main 
effect for charge similarity, F(2,171) = 15.06, p < .001. The mean ratings for 
identical, similar, and dissimilar charges were 3.33, 4.13, and 5.25, respectively, 
where a smaller number indicates greater similarity. There was also a marginally 
significant instruction effect for charge similarity ratings, F( 1,171) = 3.34, p = 
.07. Subjects who did not receive the instruction manipulation rated the charges 
as more similar (M = 4.0) than subjects with instructions (M = 4.46). For evi-
dence similarity ratings, there was only a marginally significant effect for evidence 
similarity, F{ 1,171) = 2.79, p = .10, which was rated as more similar in similar 
(M = 4.07) than in dissimilar (M = 4.5) evidence conditions. There was also a 
marginally significant charge similarity effect, F(2,171) = 2.79, p = .06, and a 
marginal effect for instructions, F(l,171) = 3.26, p = .07. The mean evidence 
similarity ratings in identical, similar and dissimilar charge conditions were 3.86, 
4.44, and 4.47, respectively, and the mean ratings for no-instructions and instruc-
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tions conditions were 4.07 and 4.50. The manipulation checks indicate that the 
charge similarity manipulation was successful, whereas the evidence similarity 
manipulation was weak. Therefore, the predicted effects of similarity should hold 
primarily for charge similarity, and not necessarily for evidence similarity. 
Questionnaire Analyses 
The effects of joinder on target offense judgments were assessed by com-
paring the target control group with the mean of the experimental groups using 
planned contrasts (Keppel, 1982). In addition, target offense judgments in joined 
conditions only were analyzed in 3 (charge similarity) x 2 (evidence similarity) 
x 2 (instructions) analyses of variance. All single-joined comparisons for which 
the hypotheses were directional used one-tailed tests, and the remaining com-
parisons used two-tailed tests. In addition to analyses on the target offense (which 
was identical in all conditions) supplemental analyses compared verdicts on the 
second and third joined offenses with their single-case counterparts. For all anal-
yses, effect sizes (Cohen, 1977) are reported along with significance tests. For / 
tests, the correlation coefficient (r) served as the effect size measure, and for F 
tests, the eta statistic provided a comparable measure. 
Verdicts. Table 2 presents the proportion of guilty verdicts obtained on the 
target charge in each cell. Analyses were performed on the proportion of guilty 
verdicts obtained. Although analysis of dichotomous measures may be lower in 
power than continuous measures, dichotomous measures are appropriate for anal-
ysis of variance and regression techniques (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). In terms of 
ecological validity, analyses of guilty-not guilty verdicts are clearly desirable. 
Analyses on the proportions revealed no significant differences between 
joined conditions and the control group, although in all but one cell the proportion 
of guilty verdicts in joined, no-instructions conditions was higher than the pro-
portion of guilty verdicts obtained in the Control group. The C x E x I analysis 
of variance revealed a significant effect for instructions. F(l,192) = 4.93, p = 
.03, eta = .16 with fewer guilty verdicts with instructions (M = .31) than without 
(M = .46). This result is particularly interesting in light of the results obtained 
by Tanford and Penrod (1984) in which the same instructions had no effect on 
representative jurors' judgments. 
Table 2. Proportion of Guilty Verdicts—Target Charge 
Identical 
.53 
(17) 
.54 
(13) 
.29 
(14) 
.20 
(15) 
Charges 
Similar 
.57 
(2i) 
.4! 
(17) 
.41 
(17) 
.47 
(15) 
Dissimilar 
.20 
(15) 
.47 
(17) 
.15 
(13) 
.27 
(11) 
Evidence 
Similar 
Dissimilar 
Similar 
Dissimilar 
No 
instructions 
Instructions 
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Also unlike Tanford and Penrod (1984), there was a significant joinder effect 
for certainty judgments in the present study, r(192) = 2.01, p = .05, r = .14. 
Subjects in joined conditions expressed more certainty in their verdicts (M = 
7.25 overall) than subjects in the control group (M = 6.55). There was also a 
main effect for instructions in the C x E x / analysis of variance, F(l,192) = 
10.42, p < 0.1, eta - 23, which indicated that subjects expressed less certainty 
with instructions (M = 6.88) than without (M = 7.56). This suggests that subjects 
were influenced by judges' instructions, and were as a result less confident that 
their verdicts were correct. 
Additional insight into the certainty results was obtained by examining sub-
jects1 certainty as a function of their verdicts (along with the other manipulations) 
in a 2 (verdict: guilty or not guilty) x 3 (charge similarity) x 2 (evidence simi-
larity) x 2 (instructions) analysis of variance. The instruction effect was again 
significant, but was qualified by a verdict x instructions interaction, F (1,136) = 
7.15 (p = .008, eta = .22. Subjects with guilty verdicts were equally certain with 
(M = 7.52) and without (M = 7.41) instructions. However, subjects who voted 
not guilty were less certain with instructions (M = 6.46) than without (M = 7.63). 
The purpose of the instruction was to reduce convictions, and the obtained in-
teraction suggests that this goal was accomplished at the expense of a loss in 
subject confidence. 
Table 3 compares the proportion of guilty verdicts obtained for the second 
and third charges in joined instructions and no-instructions conditions with the 
same offense judged as a single trial. Since the content of the charge was different 
in each experimental condition, analyses were performed on each offense (row 
of Table 3) individually. With one exception (row 4) there were more guilty ver-
dicts on the second charge in joined than single conditions, particularly without 
instructions, but only two of these differences were statistically significant. How-
ever, the analyses had low power due to small H'S of 13 to 21 subjects per cell. 
The mean joinder effect size across the six cases was .22, indicating that the 
Table 3. Proportion of Guilty Verdicts: Charges 2 and 3 Compared to Single Cases0 
Joined 
Single 
.15" 
.20" 
.19° 
.43° 
.07° 
.07° 
.00° 
.00° 
.00° 
.08* 
.06° 
.23* 
Cell# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
No instructions 
.35" 
.54* 
.52* 
.29" 
.27° 
.24" 
.41* 
.31* 
.33* 
.35* 
.13" 
.35" 
Cell# 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Instructions 
.21" 
21a.b 
.35°-* 
.27° 
.38" 
.09* 
.21"-* 
.31* 
.00* 
.13** 
.00* 
.18* 
a
 fl's = 11 to 21 per cell. 
b
 For each row, means without common subscripts are significantly different at p < .05. 
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effect was moderate in magnitude (Cohen, 1977). The strongest joinder effects 
were obtained for the third charge, particularly in identical and similar charge 
conditions, in which all four joined no-instructions means were significantly 
higher than their corresponding controls. In all cases the conviction rate was 
higher in joined than single conditions, with a mean joinder effect size across the 
six cases of .28. As was the case for charges 1 and 2, judges' instructions reduced 
the conviction rate in joined conditions. 
Although the present results suggest that joinder effects are stronger on later 
charges (contrary to Bordens and Horowitz, 1983, and Horowitz et al., 1980), it 
should be noted that each of the second and third charges was different, so that 
charge type was confounded with charge position. Thus, the position effects may 
have been due to the particular charges used, rather than position per se. The 
more important finding is that joinder effects were obtained on a variety of dif-
ferent charges, demonstrating the phenomenon's generalizability. 
Recognition Task. The recognition task required subjects to choose which 
items were present in the target offense from among four correct items, four 
incorrect items and eight false recognition items ("intrusions") from nontarget 
offenses. Analysis of the recognition results was performed on the 12 experi-
mental groups and the target control group only, because the task assessed rec-
ognition accuracy on target charge testimony. Overall, subjects were 92% accu-
rate on the correct items, and made 11% factual errors by circling incorrect items. 
Our primary concern was with intrusions or false recognitions of facts from other 
cases. There were significantly more intrusions in joined conditions (M = 1.08) 
than there were in the control group (M = .15), /(192) = 3.33, p = .001, r = 
.23. The C x E x / analysis of variance yielded a main effect for charge similarity 
F(2,191) = 7.57, p = .001, eta = .27, and a C x E interaction F(2,191) = 5.01, 
p = .01, eta = .22. As predicted, the number of intrusions increased as a function 
of charge similarity, with means of .79, .90, and 1.56 in dissimilar, similar and 
identical charge conditions. The nature of the C x E interaction was examined 
in an analysis of the simple effect of charge similarity for each level of evidence 
similarity. There was no effect for charge similarity in dissimilar evidence con-
ditions, F < 1, with means of 1.14, 1.26, and 1.29 for dissimilar, similar, and 
identical charges. The charge similarity main effect was due to a very strong 
effect for charge similarity in similar evidence conditons, F(2,94) = 13.13, p < 
.001, eta - .41, with means of .43, .61, and 1.18 for dissimilar, similar, and 
identical charges, respectively. The results for the recognition task are consistent 
with those obtained by Tanford and Penrod (1984). Joinder led to some con-
fusion of evidence among charges, confusion increased as a function of charge 
similarity, and limiting instructions did not affect memory processes. 
Evidence Ratings. Four measures of evidence strength were obtained for 
each subject: (1) prosecution evidence strength overall, (2) defense evidence 
strength overall, (3) prosecution item sum—the summed incriminating value of 
two individual pieces of prosecution evidence for the target charge and (4) defense 
item sum. For the prosecution overall rating, there was a significant joinder effect, 
/(192) = 2.26, p = .01, r = .16. Subjects in all joined conditions rated the 
prosecution evidence as stronger (M = 5.34) than subjects in the control group 
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(M = 4.05). The C x E x /analysis of variance on the overall prosecution rating 
yielded a significant charge similarity effect, F(2,191) = 3.94, p = .02, eta = 
.20, with means of 4.62, 5.72, and 5.44 in dissimilar, similar, and identical con-
ditions. There was also a significant joinder effect for the summed prosecution 
items, f(192) = 2.15,/? = .02, r = .15. Subjects in joined conditions rated specific 
items of prosecution evidence as more incriminating (M = 12.46), than subjects 
in the control group (M = 10.8). The instruction manipulation did not affect either 
prosecution evidence rating. 
For the overall defense evidence rating, there were no main effects or inter-
actions for any of the manipulations. For the summed defense items, the joinder 
effect was not significant, but there was a significant main effect for charge sim-
ilarity, F(2,190) = 8.02, p < .001, eta = .28 with means of 7.71, 9.51, and 8.03 
in dissimilar, similar, and identical charge conditions. There was also a C x E 
interaction, F(2,190) = 3.69, p < .05, eta = .19, for which the means in identical, 
similar, and dissimilar charge conditions were 8.29, 10.03, and 7.00 with similar 
evidence, and 7.75, 8.87, and 8.84 with dissimilar evidence. 
Defendant Ratings. Subjects rated the defendant on eleven 9-point bipolar 
scales on a number of traits and behaviors. Factor analysis on these ratings 
yielded two factors. The first factor contained the items honest-dishonest, good-
bad, moral-immoral, future crime likely-unlikely, believable-not believable, 
sincere-insincere, a typical criminal-not a typical criminal, dangerous-not dan-
gerous, and likeable-dislikeble. This can be considered a "criminality-credi-
bility" factor. The second factor had strong positive loadings on the items ner-
vous-calm, attractive-unattractive, and a moderate loading on likeable-dislike-
able. This can be considered to be a "global evaluation" factor. For analysis 
purposes, all items were scaled so that a higher number indicates a less favorable 
rating. 
Analyses on subjects' criminality factor scores revealed a significant joinder 
effect, /(355) = 4.42, p = .001, r = .23. The defendant was rated less favorably 
in joined (M = 28.64) than single (M = 26.64) trials. The C x E x / analysis of 
variance yielded a significant main effect for charge similarity, F(2,355) = 4.72, 
p = .01, eta = .16, and no other main effects or interactions. The defendant was 
rated less favorably when charges were identical (M = 29.10) or similar (M = 
30.48) than when charges were dissimilar (M = 25.99). 
The same effects were obtained for the defendant evaluation factor, although 
they were not as strong. Again, ratings in joined conditions were significantly 
higher than the control condition ratings (M = 11.34), t(357) = 3.01, p = .002, 
r = .16. There was a significant main effect for charge similarity on the defendant 
evaluation factor, F(2,357) = 3.35, p = .04, eta = .11, which indicated that 
subjects again rated the defendant less favorably when charges were identical (M 
= 12.67) or similar (M = 12.77) than when they were dissimilar (M = 11.49). 
Limiting instructions did not affect defendant evaluations, nor did evidence sim-
ilarity, and there were no interactions among any of the manipulations. 
Relationships Among Variables. Table 4 presents the correlations among the 
main dependent measures: defendant criminality and evaluation scores, prose-
cution and defense overall evidence ratings, memory intrusions, and verdicts. 
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Table 4. Correlations Among Dependent Measures 
Defendant evaluation 
Prosecution evidence 
Defense evidence 
Memorv 
Verdict 
Criminality 
.68" 
.56" 
- .62" 
.00 
.56" 
Evaluation 
.41" 
- .38" 
.09 
.42" 
Prosecution 
.60° 
.03 
.69" 
Defense 
-.00 
- .63" 
Memory 
.01 
a
 p < .001. 
With the exception of memory, all variables were strongly related to each other. 
Unfavorable impressions of the defendant were positively related to perceptions 
of prosecution evidence strength, and negatively related to defense evidence 
strength. Impressions of the defendant were also positively related to verdicts. 
Evidence strength was strongly related to verdicts, with a positive relationship 
for prosecution evidence, and a negative relationship for defense evidence. In 
previously reported results, the strongest joinder effects were obtained for de-
fendant ratings, and in particular defendant criminality scores. Although corre-
lational, the present results are consistent with the prediction that, to the extent 
that joinder fosters a negative impression of the defendant, this impression affects 
perceptions of the evidence and juror verdicts. 
DISCUSSION 
The present results extend the findings of previous research on joinder, and 
provide further insight into decision making processes in multiple-offense trials. 
With a few exceptions, the findings of Tanford and Penrod's (1984) study of 
deliberating qualified jurors were replicated using nondeliberating undergradu-
ates. Joinder tended to increased the proportion of guilty verdicts relative to 
single-offense control groups: however, this difference was not significant for the 
first joined charge, it was significant for two of six charges in the second position, 
and four of six charges in the third position. The reasons for the weak effects (on 
the first charge in particular) may have been due in part to low power in the 
present study, since Tanford and Penrod (1984) obtained significant joinder ef-
fects on the same offense in a study that used larger sample sizes. 
Because a number of studies have accumulated on joinder effects, a mean-
ingful way to incorporate the present results with previous findings is to combine 
the results statistically in the manner described by Rosenthal (1978). Table 5 
presents a summary of previous and present results. For joinder effects obtained 
in each study, a mean t value was computed, and a z score corresponding to the 
exact probability for that value was provided. The mean joinder effect size for 
each study was also computed. The significance of the overall joinder effect was 
computed by adding weighted z's, and the resulting Z score of 4.48 was highly 
significant at p = .0000035. Thus, although some of the joinder effects obtained 
in the present study were weak, the pattern across all studies demonstrates that 
the finding is a very robust one. Computation of a 'Tile-drawer statistic" (Ro-
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Table 5. Summary of Joinder Research Findings 
Studv 
Horowitz et al. (1980) 
Greene & Loftus (1985) 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Tanford & Penrod (1982) 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Bordens & Horowitz (1983) 
Tanford & Penrod (1984) 
Present results 
Charge 1 
Charge 2 
Charge 3 
Sum 
Mean 
Weighted Z = 4.48, p = .0000035. 
/ 
4.57 
3.14 
2.74 
2.68 
1.64 
3.32 
2.75 
.23 
1.43 
1.90 
24.40 
2.44 
df 
144 
58 
130 
80 
64 
54 
722 
192 
42 
41 
1527 
153 
P 
.0005 
.002 
.004 
.005 
.05 
.001 
.005 
.40 
.08 
.03 
.5775 
.0577 
r 
.36 
.38 
.23 
.29 
.20 
.41 
.10 
.02 
.22 
.28 
2.49 
.25 
z 
3.30 
2.90 
2.65 
2.58 
1.67 
3.12 
2.58 
.26 
1.41 
1.89 
22.36 
2.24 
senthal, 1979) revealed that 110 studies with null findings (z = 0.0) would be 
required to bring the finding down to a barely significant probability of .05. 
As noted above, the magnitude of joinder effects on verdicts in the present 
study was influenced by the position of the charge in the joined sequence, with 
stronger effects obtained for later charges. The position effects run counter to 
the findings of Bordens and Horowitz (1983) and Horowitz et al. (1980), who 
found that joinder primarily increased convictions on the first, but not the second, 
of two joined charges. Greene and Loftus (1985), on the other hand, found that 
joinder increased convictions equally on charges presented first or second. Al-
though there are some discrepancies among studies, the research demonstrates 
that the effects of joinder are not limited to charges in a particular position. The 
differences are likely due to the particular case materials and procedures used by 
different researchers, and may be partially a function of case strength. In the 
present study, charge position was confounded with the particular charges used, 
because the complexity of the materials made it impractical to include every 
charge in every position. The third charges were somewhat weaker than the first 
two, so the findings support our earlier speculation that joinder effects are 
stronger with weaker cases. 
The conditions in which significant joinder effects were obtained were ex-
clusively those involving three crimes of the same type, which were either "iden-
tical" (three service station burglaries) or similar (three burglaries at different 
establishments). No significant effects were obtained in dissimilar charge condi-
tions. This finding is consistent with the results of Bordens and Horowitz (1983), 
who also obtained more convictions when similar charges were joined. The find-
ings are also consistent with research on prior convictions, which demonstrates 
that a prior conviction for a similar crime is more likely to work against the 
defendant than is a conviction for a dissimilar crime (Sealy & Cornish, 1973; 
Wissler & Saks, 1985). 
Tanford and Penrod (1984) found that a strong and carefully designed set of 
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of limiting instructions did not influence qualified jurors' judgments; however, 
the same set of instructions did significantly reduce convictions in the present 
study. This finding runs counter to previous joinder research (Greene & Loftus, 
1985; Tanford & Penrod, 1982); and indeed, much of existing research in other 
domains which indicates that limiting instructions tend to be ineffective (Lind, 
1982). In the present study, every effort was made to design an effective manip-
ulation by elaborating on the standard instruction, while other researchers gen-
erally present the standard instruction as is, or use an artificially derived instruc-
tion. The present results indicate that it is possible to design an instruction that 
will have an effect, although it is important to note the limitations of its effec-
tiveness. First, the instruction influenced undergraduates', but not representative 
jurors' verdicts. Second, although the instruction did affect verdicts, it did not 
influence memory, evidence strength ratings, or defendant ratings. Instructions 
also reduced undergraduates' certainty in their verdicts; primarily when they 
voted not guilty, suggesting that instructions influenced verdicts at the expense 
of a loss of subjects' confidence in their decisions. 
Support was obtained for each of the three processes hypothesized to operate 
in joined trials. Joinder led to confusion of evidence, perceptions of stronger 
prosecution evidence, and negative inferences about the defendant. As in pre-
vious research (Tanford and Penrod, 1982, 1984) confusion was unrelated to 
verdicts. The single exception to this finding is the study by Bordens and 
Horowitz (1983) in which memory intrusions were related to verdicts. The present 
findings are consistent with research using other impression formation tasks, 
which indicates that memory for specific items of information is not strongly 
related to the overall impression of a stimulus (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Dreben, 
Fiske, & Hastie, 1979; Riskey, 1979). Therefore, the bulk of existing research 
supports the conclusion that confusion is not the key mediating factor in joinder. 
On the other hand, evidence and defendant ratings were related to verdicts, as 
well as to each other, consistent with the findings of Tanford and Penrod (1982, 
1984). Bordens and Horowitz (1983) also found that evidence ratings were related 
to guilt judgments, and Greene and Loftus (1985) found that defendant ratings 
were related to guilt. 
The present results are consistent with the prediction that joinder fosters an 
unfavorable impression of the defendant, which influences perceptions of the 
evidence as well as verdicts. Other joinder research supports this prediction as 
well (Greene & Loftus, 1985; Tanford & Penrod, 1982, 1984), although the 
correlational nature of the findings makes them susceptible to alternative expla-
nations. However, the pattern of relationships obtained is consistent with re-
search by Smith and Miller (1983) using a different impression formation task in 
which it was possible to specify causal direction. Smith and Miller found that 
inferences about an actor's disposition occurred prior to judgments about the 
causes of an event, suggesting that these inferences mediated causal judgments. 
Research in other jury situations demonstrates that the first information received 
has a strong influence on jurors' judgment processes, providing further evidence 
for the importance of initial impressions (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Pysz-
czynski, Greenberg, Mack & Wrightsman, 1981; Pyszczynski & Wrightsman, 
1981). 
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The existing research on joinder has significance with respect to the meth-
odological issues involved in conducting jury simulation research (Bray & Kerr, 
1981; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1979; Lind & Walker, 1979; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). 
Although there are some discrepancies among studies, significant joinder effects 
have been demonstrated in a wide variety of experimental settings under varying 
degrees of realism. The magnitude of the effects varied somewhat among studies; 
however, a statistical summary of the results of all studies indicated that the 
joinder effect is a robust one. 
The present research demonstrated that the same set of instructions that did 
not influence the representative jurors in Tanford and Penrod's (1984) study 
did affect undergraduates; otherwise deliberating jurors' and nondeliberating un-
dergraduates'judgment processes were remarkably similar. Therefore the results 
suggest that (1) results can be obtained under somewhat artificial laboratory con-
ditions that have implications for more realistic settings but (2) we should nev-
ertheless be cautious in generalizing our results. 
With this in mind, we note the practical significance of the present findings. 
The pervasiveness of joinder effects obtained in experimental settings (from very 
artificial to very realistic) suggests that the problem is of sufficient magnitude to 
warrant the attention of the courts. The courts intuitively recognize the potential 
of prejudice from joinder, and the present research provides empirical evidence 
as to the psychological processes that may result in prejudice. The law primarily 
allows for joinder of similar offenses, although the present research indicates that 
joinder of similar crimes may actually be more prejudicial than joinder of dissim-
ilar crimes. The law also assumes that the traditional limiting instruction will 
reduce prejudice from joinder, although research suggests that it will not (Greene 
& Loftus, 1985). Although elaborated instructions did reduce convictions in the 
present study, they did not with representative jurors (Tanford & Penrod, 
1984). The present results are encouraging, since they demonstrate that it is 
possible to design instructions that work. Future research efforts could be di-
rected towards desiging limiting instructions that effectively reduce judgment 
biases in the courtroom as well as the laboratory, perhaps by focusing on the 
psychological mechanisms underlying juror prejudice. 
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